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NOTE
DOES IMMUNITY MEAN IMPUNITY?
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL BATTLE
OF HOUSEHOLD WORKERS AGAINST
TRAFFICKING AND EXPLOITATION BY
THEIR FOREIGN DIPLOMAT
EMPLOYERS
“To some, human trafficking may seem like a problem limited
to other parts of the world. In fact, it occurs in every country,
including the United States, and we have a responsibility to
fight it just as others do.”1
Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton
INTRODUCTION
Before Badar Al-Awadi, the Third Secretary at the Kuwait
Mission, departed for the United States, he promised Vishranthamma
Swarna a $2,000 monthly salary, Sundays off, and one month of paid
vacation per year to visit her family in India, in exchange for working
as a live-in household servant in his New York City residence.2
However, upon her arrival, Al-Awadi confiscated Ms. Swarna‘s visa
and passport. In clear violation of the employment contract, he forced
her to work seventeen hours a day, seven days a week, paid her $200
to $300 per month, and refused to let her take off Sundays to go to
church or the month to visit her family in India.3 The Third Secretary
1 U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, ASSESSMENT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, 1 (2009), available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/2009/
126573.htm
2 Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509, 511–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 622 F.3d 123 (2d. Cir. 2010).
3 Id. at 513.
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also forbade Ms. Swarna from leaving the apartment unsupervised,
intercepted her mail and telephone calls from her family, and
prohibited her from mailing letters home or making telephone calls.4
Al-Awadi abused her almost daily, threatening to cut out her tongue,
throwing a packed suitcase at her, calling her ―dog‖ and ―donkey,‖
and dragging and locking her outside the apartment while taunting her
with warnings of further injury and/or arrest. The Third Secretary
raped her on numerous occasions and threatened to kill her if she ever
told anyone.5 As a result of this horrible treatment, Swarna suffered
dramatic weight loss, hair loss, nightmares, fatigue, and suicidal
thoughts.6
One day, Swarna asked to return to India instead of going with the
family on their trip to Kuwait. In response, Al-Awadi threatened to hit
her with an iron rod. When she screamed and warned that she would
call the police, Al-Awadi angrily replied that his brother and father
were ―high ranking police officials in Kuwait‖ and that ―once [they
returned to] Kuwait they would ‗punish‘ her.‖7 The following day,
while both Al-Awadi and his wife were out, she fled the apartment
and signaled to the first taxi she saw to ask for help.8
Swarna‘s story is only a glimpse into the countless incidents of
trafficking and abuse of household workers by their foreign-diplomat
employers who are officially located in the United States. In July
2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) submitted a
report to the Senate‘s Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law
describing the alleged abuse of domestic workers by foreign
diplomats and urging the government to strengthen its efforts to
address this problem.9 The GAO determined that between 2000 and
2008, a minimum of forty-two domestic workers brought to the U.S.
on either an A-310 or G-511 visa and employed by foreign diplomats
Id.
Id. at 513–14.
6 Id. at 514.
7 Complaint at 14, Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 06
Civ. 4880).
8 Id. at 14–15. For a discussion of the court‘s reasoning and holding in Swarna, see infra
notes 112–38 and accompanying text.
9 U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-892, U.S. GOV‘T‘S EFFORTS TO
ADDRESS THE ALLEGED ABUSE OF HOUSEHOLD WORKERS BY FOREIGN DIPLOMATS WITH
IMMUNITY COULD BE STRENGTHENED (2008), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d08892.
pdf [hereinafter GAO Report].
10 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A) (2006) (noting that A-3 visas are available to
―attendants, servants, [and] personal employees [. . . of] an ambassador, public minister, or
career diplomatic or consular officer who has been accredited by a foreign government,
recognized de jure by the United States.‖); Temporary Visitors to the U.S.: Diplomats and
Foreign Government Officials, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/
types_2637.html#.
4
5
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alleged that their diplomat employers abused them.12 The GAO
cautioned that the actual number of incidents was likely greater,13
though the director of the GAO‘s section of international affairs and
trade stated, ―[n]obody expected a number this big.‖14
Both the U.S. and the United Nations (U.N.) recognize that the
involuntary servitude of domestic workers falls within the definition
of trafficking in persons. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 200015 defines ―severe forms of trafficking in
persons‖ as ―the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or
obtaining a person for labor or services through the use of force,
fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary
servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.‖16 Similarly, the U.N.
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons17
states that trafficking includes ―forced labour or services, slavery or
practices similar to slavery [. . . and] servitude‖ and can be instigated
by means ―of coercion . . . of deception, of the abuse of power or of
[. . . placing the person in] a position of vulnerability . . . for the
purpose of exploitation.‖18
Currently, foreign diplomats are able to traffic domestic servants
inside their diplomatic residences in the United States with little to no
legal repercussions because of the almost absolute immunity granted
to diplomats under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(VCDR).19 Without any consequences, there is no incentive for
diplomats to stop engaging in this form of modern slavery. Because
diplomatic immunity is adamantly prized and guarded by all parties to

11 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(G) (2006) (G-5 visas are available to ―attendants, servants,
and personal employees‖ of individuals who are permanent mission members of a recognized
government to a designated international organization and representatives of governments who
are attending meetings of a designated international organizations.); U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE,
supra note 10.
12 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 3.
13 Id. at 13–16 (explaining that the victims‘ fear of being deported and of law
enforcement, the inability to leave the residence, the refusal to identify themselves or their
diplomat employers in addition to the government‘s policy of not disclosing details of criminal
investigations, and the lack of an effective way of searching across the various agencies‘
databases make it very likely that the actual number of cases is greater than the forty-two
reported incidents).
14 Sarah Fitzpatrick, Diplomatic Immunity Leaves Abused Workers in the Shadows,
WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2009, at A4.
15 Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C).
16 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(B) (2006).
17 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001).
18 Id. at art. 3(a).
19 Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter VCDR].
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the VCDR, States typically resist any attempts to whittle away these
protections for their own diplomats. While some victims are able to
obtain a measure of legal redress by waiting to bring suit against their
diplomat employers until after the diplomat‘s term in the U.S. ends
(or by wrangling an occasional settlement), these remedies are often
limited and difficult to obtain. Therefore, a more comprehensive
approach involving various institutional solutions, such as improving
internal procedures at embassies, consulates, and international
organizations, in conjunction with using tools already present in the
VCDR, such as bringing suit under residual immunity and expanding
the use of persona non grata, may be the most productive and
successful way to alleviate the problem.
This Note breaks down the overarching problem of human
trafficking inside diplomatic residences into three main topics and
offers solutions specific to the issues within these areas. Part I
provides an overview of the origins and nature of diplomatic
immunity. Part II analyzes the issues domestic-worker litigants face
in trying to seek judicial relief for the abuse and discusses the limited
nature of judicial remedies. Part III explores immigration and
institutional policies and initiatives, along with various additional
mechanisms, to prevent domestic workers from entering into abusive
situations and to provide assistance resources for them if they are in
an abusive environment. Lastly, Part IV discusses the diplomatic
process and the measures the U.S. Department of State (State
Department) has taken to combat trafficking inside diplomatic
residences located on American soil. It also lays out several steps that
the State Department may take in the future to combat this problem.
I. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY OVERVIEW
Though the exploitation of domestic workers by foreign diplomats
clearly falls within the definition of trafficking in persons accepted by
the U.S. and U.N.,20 diplomats have remained largely immune from
suits brought by their employees because of the almost absolute
nature of diplomatic immunity. Diplomatic immunity from criminal
and civil suits has been an established international practice for
centuries21 and was codified as international law in the VCDR, which
See supra text accompanying notes 15–18.
See EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 280–83 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining that immunity from criminal
jurisdiction can be traced back to sixteenth century practices and immunity from civil suit was a
―well established rule‖ by the early eighteenth century); Schooner Exch. v. M‘Faddon, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116, 143 (1812) (―‗It is impossible to conceive . . . that a Prince who sends an
ambassador or any other minister can have any intention of subjecting him to the authority of a
20
21
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is almost universally adopted.22 The purpose of the VCDR ―is not to
benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the
functions of diplomatic missions as representing States.‖23 Under the
VCDR, diplomats and their families have immunity from the
receiving State‘s civil and administrative jurisdiction.24 Congress later
enacted the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978,25 which provides that
―[a]ny action or proceeding brought against an individual who is
entitled to immunity with respect to such action or proceeding under
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations . . . shall be
dismissed.‖26 The Act further provides that a defendant can establish
diplomatic immunity by simply filing a motion or suggestion
claiming such immunity.27 Courts rely on the State Department‘s
formal recognition of the defendant as a diplomat and accept the
government‘s confirmation of the emissary‘s diplomatic status as
conclusive.28
U.N. representatives are entitled to the same level of full immunity
as diplomats.29 U.N. representatives‘ immunity is derived from the
Headquarters Agreement,30 which established the U.N. headquarters
in New York City and governs the relationship between the U.N. and
the United States.31 Article V, section 15 provides that U.N.
representatives ―shall, whether residing inside or outside the
headquarters district, be entitled in the territory of the United States to
the same privileges and immunities, subject to corresponding
conditions and obligations, as it accords to diplomatic envoys
accredited to it.‖32

foreign power . . . .‘‖ (quoting EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF LAW OF NATURE 471 (1797))).
22 See Denza, supra note 21, at 1 (noting that 185 states are parties to the VCDR, which
―is close to the entire number of independent States in the world‖).
23 VCDR, supra note 19, at pmbl. cl. 4.
24 Id. art. 31(1) (―A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from [the receiving State‘s]
civil and administrative jurisdiction.‖); id. art. 37 (―The members of the family of a diplomatic
agent forming part of his household shall, if they are not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy
the privileges and immunities specified in article 29 to 36.‖).
25 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a–254e (2006).
26 Id. § 254d.
27 Id.
28 Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187, 192 (D.D.C. 2007).
29 Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
23, 2002) (―Both the United States and the United Nations agree that permanent representatives
and ministers of foreign nations to the United Nations are entitled to full diplomatic immunity,
that is, the immunities codified in the Vienna Convention.‖).
30 Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States Regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, U.S.-U.N., June 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 756.
31 Id.
32 Id. art. V, § 15(4).
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Representatives of the U.N. and other international organizations,
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
also are afforded a more limited immunity under the International
Organizations Immunity Act (IOIA).33 The IOIA provides that
officers, employees, and representatives of foreign governments to
international organizations ―shall be immune from suit and legal
process relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity
and falling within their functions as such representatives, officers, or
employees,‖ unless the sending State or international organization
waives the immunity.34
II. LEGAL OBSTACLES AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES
Over the past decade, domestic-worker litigants have presented a
wide gamut of arguments for why the trafficking of domestic workers
inside the diplomat‘s residence falls outside of the activities covered
by diplomatic immunity. They have argued that: employing a
domestic worker falls within the commercial-activities exception;35
human trafficking is a jus cogens exception to diplomatic immunity;36
involuntary servitude is a tort in violation of internationally
recognized norms of international law;37 human trafficking violates
the Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from slavery;38 and
defrauding the American government should not be covered by
diplomatic immunity.39 However, because of the strict adherence to
full diplomatic immunity for a current diplomat or state representative
in international organizations, courts have consistently remained
unsympathetic to these arguments and found in favor of the
diplomat.40 Only when the domestic worker waited until the
diplomat‘s term inside the United States expired and brought suit
under the residual immunity theory have litigants experienced any
form of judicial relief.41
22 U.S.C. § 288d (2006).
Id. § 288d(b) (emphasis added).
35 See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
36 See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
37 See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
38 See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
39 See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
40 See, e.g., Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d 535 (4th
Cir. 1996); Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2007); Sabbithi v. Al Saleh,
605 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C 2009); Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224 (DLC), 2002 WL
1964806 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002).
41 See, e.g., Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, Nos. 09-2525-cv (L), 09-3615-cv (XAP), 2010 WL 3719219 (2d. Cir.
Sept. 24, 2010) (holding that, because defendant's ―diplomatic duties in the United States had
terminated and he had departed the country,‖ he is no longer entitled to the privileges he once
33
34
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A. Suits Brought Against the Diplomat While the Diplomat Is an
Accredited Diplomat in the United States
1. Commercial-Activities Exception
An important exception to the general rule of absolute immunity
for current diplomats is the commercial-activities exception. Article
31(1)(c) of the VCDR states that a diplomat is not immune from suit
arising from actions ―relating to any professional or commercial
activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State
outside his official functions.‖42 The VCDR expressly prohibits
diplomats from engaging in any professional or commercial activity
for personal profit within the receiving State.43 In their litigation,
domestic workers have unsuccessfully relied on the theories that the
employment relationship, 44 false imprisonment,45 and trafficking46 all
fall ―outside [diplomats‘] official functions.‖ This section explains the
U.S. government and federal courts‘ reasoning in consistently
rejecting this use of the commercial-activities exception to diplomatic
immunity.
The VCDR does not provide a concrete definition of ―commercial
activities,‖ so the courts and the government have looked to the
negotiating history of the VCDR to determine its meaning. The
United Nations International Law Commission (ILC), a group of
international-law experts, prepared an initial draft of the VCDR,
which was considered at a formal U.N. conference in 1961.47 It was
not until the ILC‘s Ninth Session that Alfred Verdross of Austria
proposed an amendment creating an exception to immunity for acts
―‗relating to a professional activity outside [the diplomatic agent‘s]
official duties.‘‖48 Though many members of the Commission thought
that the clause was redundant and unnecessary because diplomats
were barred from participating in professional and business activities,

retained as a Kuwati diplomat); Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(holding that, as a former diplomat, defendant was entitled to a much more limited form of
immunity than that of a current diplomat).
42 VCDR, supra note 19, art. 31(1)(c).
43 Id. art. 42.
44 Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 287–88; Gonzalez Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 190.
45 Tabion, at 287–88; Gonzales Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 190.
46 Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 126 (D.D.C 2009).
47 United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, 1 Official
Records 79–82, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.20/14, U.N. Sales No. 61.X.2 (1961).
48 Statement of Interest of the United States at 8, Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d
122 (D.D.C 2009) (No. 07-115) [hereinafter Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi] (quoting Summary
Records of the 402nd Meeting, [1957] 1 Y.B. Int‘l L. Comm‘n 97, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1957).
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the Commission decided to include the amendment. In addition, the
Commission added the adjective ―commercial,‖ based on the rare, but
possible, occurrence of diplomats engaging in commercial activities
outside their official functions.49 When an Australian member
suggested that the term ―commercial activity‖ needed an explanation,
the Special Rapporteur responded that ―the use of the words
‗commercial activity‘ as part of the phrase ‗a professional or
commercial activity‘ indicates that it is not a single act of commerce
which is meant, by [sic] a continuous activity.‖50 The ILC was
concerned that if the exception encompassed single transactions, then
―the door would be open to a gradual whittling away of the
diplomatic agent‘s immunities from jurisdiction.‖51
The ILC added the amendment largely because the members did
not believe that a diplomat should be able to claim immunity for acts
forbidden in the VCDR.52 In response to an American member‘s
remark that this exception went beyond existing international law, the
Special Rapportuer explained that the exception was aimed at
activities that conflicted with diplomatic status. The Special
Rapportuer asserted, ―[i]t would be quite improper if a diplomatic
agent, ignoring the restraints [on engaging in professional and
commercial activities] which his status ought to have imposed upon
him, could, by claiming immunity, force the client to go abroad in
order to have the case settled by a foreign court.‖53 In the Report of
the Commission to the General Assembly, the Commission explained,
―activities of these kinds are normally wholly inconsistent with the
position of a diplomatic agent, and that one possible consequence of
his engaging in them might be that he would be declared persona non
grata.‖54 The Commission continued by explaining that if the
diplomat does engage in commercial activities, then ―the persons with

49

Tabion, 877 F.Supp. at 290 (citing Summary Records of the 402nd Meeting, supra note

48).
50 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 9 (quoting Special Rapporteur, Diplomatic
Intercourse and Immunities: Summary of Observations Received from Governments and
Conclusions of the Special Rapporteur, at 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/116 (1958) (by A. Emil F.
Sandstruöm)).
51 Id. at 10 (quoting Summary Records of the 476th Meeting, [1958] 1 Y.B. Int‘l L.
Comm‘n 244, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958).
52 VCDR, supra note 19, art. 42 (―A diplomatic agent shall not in the receiving State
practise for personal profit any professional or commercial activity‖).
53 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 10 (quoting Diplomatic Intercourse and
Immunities, supra note 50 at 57.
54 Id. at 11 (quoting Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/3859, reprinted in [1958] 2 Y.B. Int‘l L. Comm‘n 98, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/
Add.1). Persona non grata is Latin for ―an unwelcome person.‖
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whom the diplomatic agent has had commercial or professional
relations cannot be deprived of their ordinary remedies.‖55
The U.S. had another reason for accepting the commercialactivities exception. In its instructions to the U.S. delegation to the
U.N. conference at which the ILC draft was considered, the State
Department highlighted that ―[w]hile American diplomatic officers
are forbidden to engage in such activities in the country of their
assignment, other states have not all been so inclined to restrict the
activities of their diplomatic agents.‖56 The instructions further
explained that the commercial-activities exception would ―enable
persons in the receiving State who have professional and business
dealings of a non-diplomatic character with a diplomatic agent to
have the same recourse against him in the courts as they would have
against a non-diplomatic person engaging in similar activities.‖57
The negotiating history of the exception was the basis for the U.S.
government‘s rebuttal to domestic workers‘ arguments that their
employment relationship fell within the commercial-activities
exception. The U.S. government argued in its Statements of Interest58
that the commercial-activity exception ―focuses on the pursuit of
trade or business activity unrelated to diplomatic work‖59 and ―does
not encompass contractual relationships for goods and services
incidental to the daily life of the diplomat and the diplomat‘s family
in the receiving State.‖60 The Department of Justice concluded that
diplomats are immune from suits brought by their domestic-worker
employees alleging breach of employment contract and violation of
federal employment laws.61 The courts have mostly deferred to the
government‘s Statements of Interest because the Supreme Court has
held that, ―although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty

Id. (quoting Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 54).
Id. (quoting 7 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DEP‘T OF STATE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 406 (1970)).
57 Id. (quoting WHITEMAN, supra note 56 at 406).
58 The Department of Justice submits Statements of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517
(2006) (―The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent by the
Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to attend to the interests of the
United States in a suit pending in a court in the United States . . . .‖).
59 Id. at 6; Statement of Interest of the United States at 8, Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479
F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 06-cv-00089-PLF) [hereinafter Gov‘t Statement, Gonzalez
Paredes]; see also Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 537–38 (4th Cir. 1996).
60 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 7; Gov‘t Statement, Gonzalez Paredes,
supra note 59, at 5 (same); see also Tabion, 73 F.3d at 537 (―When examined in context, the
term ‗commercial activity‘ does not have so broad a meaning as to include occasional service
contracts.‖).
61 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 5; Gov‘t Statement, Gonzalez Paredes,
supra note 59, at 2.
55
56
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provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation
and enforcement is entitled to great weight.‖62
In Tabion v. Mufti,63 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia was the first to tackle the question of
whether the employment relationship between a domestic worker and
a foreign diplomat falls within the commercial-activities exception.
Corazon Tabion accepted a position as a domestic servant for Faris
Mufti, the First Secretary at the Embassy of Jordan in Washington,
D.C. Mufti promised to pay Tabion the U.S. minimum wage, plus
overtime, and a ―reasonable work schedule in a comfortable
environment.‖64 Upon arrival, Mufti confiscated her passport, forced
her to work sixteen hours a day for fifty cents an hour, with no
overtime pay, and threatened termination, deportation, and arrest if
she tried to leave the residence.65 After working for twenty-eight
months, Tabion brought suit against Mufti under the Fair Labor
Standards Act66 for not paying minimum wage plus overtime, breach
of the employment contract, intentional misrepresentations, false
imprisonment, and discrimination based on race.67 In response to
Mufti‘s motion to quash based on diplomatic immunity, Tabion
argued that her case fell within the commercial-activities exception.68
Because the term ―commercial activities‖ was not defined in the
VCDR, the court looked to the drafting and negotiating history of the
VCDR and the exception, as well as the government‘s Statement of
Interest.69 The district court determined that ―the Commission did not
intend to deprive diplomats of immunity for commercial transactions
that are unrelated to the pursuit of a business or trade, but that are
merely incidental to day-to-day life.‖70 The district court dismissed
the case because the negotiating history ―points persuasively to the
conclusion that Article 31(1)(c) was not intended to carve out a broad
exception to diplomatic immunity for a diplomat‘s daily contractual
transactions for personal goods and services.‖71 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court‘s
decision and added that the exception does not ―have so broad a
62 United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982)).
63 877 F. Supp. 285 (E.D.Va. 1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996).
64 Id. at 286.
65 Id.
66 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–207 (2006).
67 Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 286.
68 Id. at 287.
69 Id. at 289–91; see also supra notes 47–57.
70 Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 290.
71 Id. at 291.
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meaning as to include occasional service contracts as [Plaintiff]
contends, but rather relates only to trade or business activity engaged
in for personal profit.‖72 The court continued by stating that the
―[d]ay-to-day living services such as dry cleaning or domestic help
were not meant to be treated as outside a diplomat‘s official
functions. Because these services are incidental to daily life,
diplomats are immune from disputes arising out of them.‖73
Courts outside the Fourth Circuit have adopted Tabion’s definition
of commercial activity in the domestic-worker context.74
Additionally, the government has consistently urged the court to
adopt this interpretation in its Statements of Interest.75 The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, for example,
rejected the commercial-activities exception claim brought by Lucia
Mabel Gonzalez Paredes. Gonzalez Paredes, a domestic worker from
Paraguay, was hired by an Argentinean diplomat in Washington,
D.C., and worked for an average of seventy-seven hours per week, for
only five hundred dollars a month.76 Gonzalez Paredes essentially
argued that the employment relationship constituted a commercial
activity outside the diplomat‘s official function, thereby falling within
Article 42 of the VCDR.77 Relying on the holding in Tabion and the
government‘s Statement of Interest, the court found ―no reason to
disagree with the conclusion of the Department of State—and the
Fourth Circuit—that a contract for domestic services such as the one
at issue in this case is not itself a ‗commercial activity.‘‖78
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
reaffirmed the Gonzalez Paredes rationale two years later in Sabbithi
v. Al Saleh.79 Based on these decisions and on the government‘s
consistent stance against the employment relationship being a
commercial-activities exception, it is unlikely that the commercialactivities exception will be a useful tool for future domestic-servant
plaintiffs.
Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 537 (4th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 538–39.
74 E.g., Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2007); Sabbithi v. Al
Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2009), .
75 E.g., Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48; Gov‘t Statement, Gonzales Paredes,
supra note 59.
76 Gonzalez Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 190. This practice violated the contract presented
at the American Embassy, in which the diplomat agreed to pay Gonzales Paredes $6.72 per
hour, plus overtime. Id.
77 Id. at 192.
78 Id. at 193.
79 605 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (―Hiring household help is incidental to the daily life of a
diplomat and therefore not commercial for purposes of the exception to the Vienna
Convention.‖).
72
73
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2. Customary International Law Exceptions
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties80 defines a jus
cogens norm as ―a peremptory norm of general international law . . .
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character.‖81 Jus cogens norms hold the highest position in
international law and supersede treaties and customary international
law.82 Therefore, if a provision of a treaty conflicts with a jus cogens
norm, then the conflicting treaty provision is void.83 Many litigants
have argued that granting immunity to diplomats who traffic
household workers inside their residences violates the jus cogens
norm prohibiting slavery, and courts should therefore deny motions
for immunity. However, as this section explains, courts have
consistently rejected this argument.
In Gonzalez Paredes, the court declined to address the issue of
whether the diplomat‘s conduct violated jus cogens norms because
the plaintiff did not allege slavery or human trafficking in the
complaint.84 Two years later, Mani Kumari Sabbithi, a domestic
worker from India who was employed by Major Waleed KH N.S. Al
Saleh during his tenure as Attaché to the Embassy of Kuwait in the
U.S., brought suit in the same court explicitly alleging slavery in
violation of jus cogens norms.85 Al Saleh lured Sabbithi to the U.S.
with an employment contract promising her a $1,314 monthly salary
and compliance with U.S. labor laws that Al Saleh presented to the
U.S. Embassy in Kuwait.86 Al Saleh did not abide by the contract, but
instead took her passport, forced her to work sixteen to nineteen hours
a day, seven days a week, sent only $242 to $346 per month directly
to her family overseas, threatened her with physical injury, and
physically abused her.87
Sabbithi argued that the court should deny diplomatic immunity
because the diplomat‘s conduct constituted human trafficking and
thus violated jus cogens norms prohibiting slavery.88 Sabbithi further
argued that the VCDR similarly conflicts with jus cogens norms
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Id. art. 53.
82 Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 129 (D.D.C 2009) (citing Comm. of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
83 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 80, art. 53.
84 Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187, 195 (D.D.C. 2007).
85 Sabbithi, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 122.
86 Id. at 125.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 129.
80
81
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because it immunizes slaveholders from liability.89 The government
disagreed and made clear that the U.S. position was that there is no
jus cogens exception to diplomatic immunity.90 The government
argued, ―diplomatic immunity is itself a fundamental principle of
international law and there is no evidence that the international
community has come to recognize a jus cogens exception to
diplomatic immunity.‖91 The government was particularly concerned
that straying from this global consensus would lead to a heightened
risk of other states subjecting American diplomats to contentious
litigation in foreign jurisdictions.92 Accepting the government‘s
position, the court decided that there was no jus cogens norm at issue
because the evidence did not convince the court that the diplomat‘s
conduct constituted human trafficking.93
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York has similarly rejected the argument that because involuntary
servitude is a tort in violation of internationally recognized norms of
international law, the court has jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA).94 The ATCA grants district courts original
jurisdiction over ―any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.‖95 The Supreme Court addressed customary international
law‘s relation to the ATCA in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.96 The court
determined that Congress, at the time of the ATCA‘s passage,
intended three types of torts to be covered: ―violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.‖97
The Court mentioned the possibility of new causes of action but
noted, ―any claim based on the present-day law of nations [must] rest
on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world
and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18thcentury paradigms we have recognized.‖98 While the Second Circuit
has allowed ATCA claims to proceed when the defendant was not
immune, when the court found defendants to be immune, it rejected
ATCA claims because the ATCA does not supersede diplomatic
Id.
Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 20.
91 Id. (internal citations omitted).
92 Id. at 21.
93 Sabbithi, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 129.
94 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see also Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL
1964806, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002).
95 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
96 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
97 Id. at 715. (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68 (1769)).
98 Id. at 725.
89
90
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immunity.99 Therefore, it is more than likely that future diplomat
defendants will prevail over any arguments that their conduct violates
established customary international law and will continue to be
unscathed by suits brought during their tenure.
3. Thirteenth-Amendment Claims
Litigants have also been unsuccessful in arguing that diplomats
should be subject to liability for constitutional claims arising under
the Thirteenth Amendment‘s prohibition of slavery and involuntary
servitude. In Ahmed v. Hoque,100 the court rejected the plaintiff‘s
argument that the court should create an exception to diplomatic
immunity for constitutional claims.101 The court reasoned that case
law does not establish that all constitutional claims, including those
not prompted by congressional enactment, must be heard in a judicial
forum.102 Instead, the court cited the political-question and the
sovereign-immunity doctrines in support of its argument that ―some
constitutional claims can and do go unheard.‖103 Similarly, in
Sabbithi, the court and the government stated that precedent suggests
that diplomats are shielded from liability for alleged constitutional
violations under diplomatic immunity.104 The government further
explained, ―although Plaintiffs correctly note that treaty provisions
are subject to constitutional limitations, there is no conflict between
the Vienna Convention and the Thirteenth Amendment. Nothing in
the Vienna Convention authorizes involuntary servitude or any other
practice forbidden by the Constitution . . . .‖105
4. Fraud
Gonzalez Paredes, a domestic worker from Paraguay who worked
for an Argentinean diplomat in Washington, D.C., also tried to argue
that her diplomat employer was not entitled to diplomatic immunity
because he defrauded the U.S. government. Specifically, the diplomat
instructed Gonzales Paredes to tell the U.S. Embassy that the
diplomat agreed to pay her the amount specified in the employment
99 See, e.g., Ahmed, 2002 WL 1964806, at *8 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 247
(2d Cir. 1995) and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1980)).
100 No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 23, 2002).
101 Id. at *6–7.
102 Id. at *7.
103 Id. (citing F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484–86 (1994)).
104 Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 129 (D.D.C. 2009); Gov‘t Statement,
Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 21 (―Indeed, we are not aware of any United States court that has
recognized a jus cogens exception to a diplomat's immunity from its civil jurisdiction.‖).
105 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 18–19 (citation omitted).
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contract presented at the embassy instead of the lower wages he told
her he would pay. The court immediately rejected this argument on
the basis that the VCDR does not recognize fraud as an exception to
diplomatic immunity. The court asserted that this is an argument that
should be presented to Congress or the State Department and that the
courts have no authority over this matter.106
B. Suits Brought Under Residual Immunity After the
Diplomat’s Term Expires
Thus far, domestic workers have only been successful in defeating
motions to dismiss when they waited until the diplomats were no
longer serving in their official capacities and then sued under the
theory that the diplomats were no longer protected by residual
immunity.107 Article 39 of the VCDR provides the basis for this
argument, stating, ―[w]hen the functions of a person enjoying
privileges and immunities have come to an end, such privileges and
immunities shall normally cease at the moment when he leaves the
country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but
shall subsist until that time . . . .‖108 However, Article 39 grants
continuing immunity for those ―acts performed by such persons in the
exercise of his functions as a member of the mission . . . .‖109
Therefore, the determinative issue is whether the diplomat performed
the acts in question in the exercise of his or her diplomatic functions.
If the acts constitute official functions, then the former diplomat
remains immune from suit; but if the acts fall outside diplomatic
functions, then the former diplomat becomes liable for those actions
in court.
District judges seem to be a driving force behind this newfound
effort to allow domestic-servant claims to proceed under the theory
that residual immunity does not shield the diplomat from all claims.
Although the court in Gonzalez Paredes granted the defendant‘s
motion to dismiss, the district judge added that the complaint was
dismissed without prejudice, and that the claims could be re-filed if
and when the diplomat no longer enjoyed full diplomatic immunity.110
He even proceeded to recommend that the statute of limitations be
tolled until the diplomat was no longer immune from suit.111
106 Gonzalez

Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187, 194 (D.D.C. 2007).
immunity is also referred to as ―functional‖ and ―continuing‖ immunity, but
this Note will consistently refer to it simply as ―residual immunity.‖
108 VCDR, supra note 19, art. 39(2).
109 Id.
110 Gonzalez Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
111 Id. at 189 n.2 (citing Knab v. Republic of Georgia, No. 97-3118, 1998 WL 34067108,
107 Residual
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Therefore, he impliedly recommended that the plaintiff relitigate the
case under the theory of residual immunity once the diplomat ceased
serving in his official capacity.
Another district court judge made a similar recommendation to
Vishranthamma Swarna. She originally brought suit against her
diplomat employer, Badar Al-Awadi, a diplomat stationed at the
Permanent Mission of the State of Kuwait to the U.N. in New York
City, but the Southern District of New York dismissed her case
because Al-Awadi was then still employed by the Kuwait Mission
and was therefore entitled to full diplomatic immunity. 112 The judge,
however, dismissed her case ―without prejudice because plaintiff
could plausible [sic] institute a new action against defendants now
that they are no longer associated with the Kuwaiti Mission.‖113
Swarna re-filed her suit against Al-Awadi once he concluded his
diplomatic service in New York and was reassigned to the Embassy
of Kuwait in Paris.114 Swarna had to overcome service hurdles
because of Al-Awadi‘s new post, but the district court judge still
seemed open to finding a way to bring the diplomat into court.
Swarna first served the State Department‘s Office of the Legal
Advisor and then attempted to serve Al-Awadi and his wife under the
Hague Service Convention.115 However, because of his diplomatic
status in France, the French government refused service.116 Despite
the U.S. government‘s objection, the judge granted the plaintiff‘s
motion for alternative service by an international courier that records
the delivery in writing or electronically and by U.S. mail in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3).117 Thus,
Swarna was able to overcome the obstacle of Al-Awadi‘s ability to
claim diplomatic immunity in his subsequent post.

at *4 (D.D.C. May 29, 1998)).
112 Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, Nos. 09-2525-cv (L), 09-3615-cv (XAP), 2010 WL 3719219 (2d. Cir. Sept. 24, 2010).
For factual background, see supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.
113 Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d. at 514 (quoting Summary Order, Vishranthamma v. AlAwadi, No. 02 Civ. 3710 (PKL)(MHD) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2006).
114 See id.
115 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and
Commercial Matters, art. 9, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S.
163. (―Each contracting State shall be free, in addition, to use consular channels to forward
documents, for the purpose of service, to those authorities of another contracting State wich
[sic] are designated by the latter for this purpose. Each contracting State may, if exceptional
circumstances so require, use diplomatic channels for the same purpose.‖).
116 Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 06 Civ. 4880 (PKC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72661, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007).
117 Id. at *4–5.
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Finally, in March 2009, Swarna became the first domestic servant
to win a default judgment against her diplomat employer based on the
theory of residual immunity.118 The district court rejected Al-Awadi‘s
argument that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction based on
diplomatic immunity because Al-Awadi was a former diplomat to the
U.S. who had already left the country and was therefore entitled to the
more limited immunity in U.S. courts under Article 39 of the
VCDR.119 Since a former diplomat has immunity only for ―‗acts
performed . . . in the exercise of his functions as a member of the
mission,‘‖ the court had to determine whether Al-Awadi‘s acts were
―private acts,‖ and therefore not covered by immunity, or ―official
acts,‖ which fell within residual immunity.120 Once again, the court
looked to the purpose of diplomatic immunity, which ―‗is not to
benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the
functions of diplomatic missions as representing States.‘‖121 The court
explained that once a diplomat‘s duties have terminated in the host
country, ―there ceases to be a reason to immunize that person from
criminal or civil jurisdiction of the Receiving State‖ because the
purpose of the immunity is not to give a personal benefit to the
diplomat but to ensure the efficient functioning of the mission.122
Once the diplomat‘s duties have ended, the efficient functioning of
the mission will no longer be affected if the former diplomat is held
responsible for ―private acts.‖123 However, ―‗acts performed . . . in the
exercise of his functions as a member of the mission‘‖ continue to be
covered under residual immunity because ―official acts‖ are imputed
to, and thus indirectly implicate, the sending State.124
What constitutes an official act? The court explained, ―official
acts‖ irrefutably encompass the Article 3 listing of ―functions of [the]
diplomatic mission.‖125 However, if an act is ―entirely peripheral to
the diplomat‘s official duties,‖ then it will likely not fall within the
118 Swarna,

607 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
at 516–17.
120 Id. (quoting VCDR, supra note 19, art. 39(2)).
121 Id. at 516 (quoting VCDR, supra note 19, pmbl., cl. 4).
122 Id. at 516–17.
123 Id. at 517.
124 Id. at 516–17 (quoting VCDR, supra note 19, art. 39(2)).
125 Id. at 517 & n.10 (―The functions of a diplomatic mission consist inter alia in: (a)
representing the sending State in the receiving State; (b) protecting in the receiving State the
interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international
law; (c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State; (d) ascertaining by all lawful
means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting them thereon to the
Government of the sending State; (e) prompting friendly relations between the sending State and
the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural, and scientific relations.‖ (quoting
VCDR, supra note 19, art. 3(1))).
119 Id.
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grant of residual immunity.126 The Swarna court also noted that other
courts have held that employment decisions and relationships at a
diplomatic mission were covered by residual immunity because an
element of the diplomat‘s official duties is to staff the mission and the
mission cannot efficiently function without the employment of certain
personnel.127 However, the court asserted, ―[i]t does not follow that
all employment-related acts by a diplomat are official acts to which
residual immunity attaches once the diplomat‘s duties end.‖128 The
court reasoned that when a diplomat employs a person unrelated to
the diplomatic mission, it is not the same as an act performed on
behalf of the sending State, such as staffing a diplomatic mission.129
The court decided that the employment relationship between Swarna
and Al-Awadi constituted a private act because the employment of a
household worker did not fall within the meaning of Article 3, nor
was it part of the implementation of official policy of the sending
State.130 Instead, Al-Awadi hired Swarna to take care of his family‘s
personal affairs in his private residence.131 The court dismissed the
―tangential benefit‖ to the Kuwaiti Mission of Swarna occasionally
serving members of the Mission while Al-Awadi was entertaining
them at his home.132 Therefore, the court held that plaintiff won a
default judgment on her labor-law claims because Al-Awadi‘s failure
to pay minimum wage and overtime pay was not covered by residual
immunity.133
Swarna was also successful in winning a default judgment for
―trafficking, involuntary servitude, enslavement, forced labor, rape
and sexual slavery‖134 brought under the ATCA.135 In determining
that ―trafficking, involuntary servitude, enslavement, forced labor,
and sexual slavery‖ were ―private acts,‖ the court analogized this case
126 Id. at 518; see also United States v. Guinand, 688 F. Supp. 774, 776–77 (D.D.C. 1988)
(holding that a former diplomat who distributed cocaine during his term as diplomat was not
entitled to residual immunity).
127 Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d. at 518; see also Brzak v. United Nations, 551 F. Supp. 2d
313, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (dismissing a suit brought by U.N. employees against former U.N.
officials and the U.N. for sexual harassment, employment discrimination, and indecent battery
based on the rationale that ―courts have consistently found that functional immunity applies to
employment-related suits against officials of international organizations‖); De Luca v. United
Nations, 841 F. Supp. 531, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that U.N. officials‘ wrongful conduct
in the workplace was covered by IOIA because employment activities qualify as official
conduct).
128 Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
129 Id. at 519–20.
130 Id. at 520.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 522.
135 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
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to United States v. Guinand.136 Guinand held that a former diplomat
who distributed cocaine during his tenure was not immune from
prosecution under his residual immunity because the illegal cocaine
distribution was completely peripheral to his official diplomatic
duties.137 The Swarna court explained, ―to conclude that the residual
diplomatic immunity provided by Art. 39 extends to rape, forced
labor, and the other malicious acts alleged here would be tantamount
to holding that . . . all acts of a diplomatic agent are ‗official acts‘‖
and that there is ―no support for such a proposition.‖138 Finding these
―private acts‖ entirely peripheral to the diplomat‘s duties and
therefore outside the realm of residual immunity, the court granted
Swarna a default judgment as to her ATCA claims.139
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the district court‘s decision
that Al-Awadi was not protected by residual immunity.140 The court
rejected Al-Awadi‘s argument that Swarna‘s role was to help him
with mission-related functions and thus he was immune from suit.141
The court pointed to several facts to support its conclusion that
Swarna was employed to attend to the diplomat‘s private needs.142
First, the nature of her responsibilities, such as cooking, cleaning,
taking care of the children, was personal rather than related to the
mission.143 Second, Swarna‘s cooking for and serving guests at
official functions were merely incidental to her position as his private
servant.144 Thirdly, Al-Awadi, not the mission, paid for her
services.145 Lastly, Swarna was issued a G-5 visa, which is issued to
―attendants, servants, and personal employees of any such
representative,‖146 rather than a G-2 visa, which is issued to ―other
accredited representatives of such a foreign government.‖147 The court
made clear that even if Swarna‘s employment could be deemed an
official act, ―[o]nly if the commission of such crimes could be
considered an official act would residual immunity apply.‖148
Although the Second Circuit found that residual immunity did not
bar Swarna‘s claims, it held that the default judgment was improperly
136 688

F. Supp. 774 (D.D.C. 1988).
607 F.Supp. 2d at 521.

137 Swarna,
138 Id.
139 Id.

at 522.
v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 140 (2d. Cir. 2010).
141 Id. at 137–38.
142 Id. at 138.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(G)(v)(2006).
147 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(G)(v)(2006); Swarna, 622 F.3d at 138.
148 Swarna, 622 F.3d at 12.
140 Swarna
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granted.149 It determined that Al-Awadi‘s default was not willful, but
was based on the mistaken belief that he was immune from suit.150
Secondly, the court determined that setting aside the default judgment
would not prejudice Swarna‘s claims.151 Despite the court‘s decision
to set aside the default judgment, the Second Circuit‘s decision will
be valuable precedent for other domestic servants who bring claims
against their former diplomat employers after their official tenure is
concluded.
Plaintiffs can also turn to Baoanan v. Baja152 to support their
claims against former diplomats. Marichu Suarez Baoanan, a recent
nursing graduate, paid Norma Castro Baja, the wife of the Permanent
Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, 250,000
Philippine Pesos in what Baoanan thought was an exchange for travel
to the U.S., a U.S. employment-based visa, and help in finding a
nursing position. Upon Baoanan‘s arrival in New York City,
however, Baja‘s driver drove Baoanan directly to the Bajas‘ residence
at the Philippine Mission. Mrs. Baja then confiscated Baoanan‘s
passport and informed her that she had to work for six months to pay
off an additional 250,000 pesos for travel expenses and employment
arrangements. The Bajas forced Baoanan to work eighteen hours per
day, seven days a week, performing household tasks, monitoring Mrs.
Baja‘s blood pressure and diabetes, providing child care for the Bajas‘
son, and preparing for and cleaning up after weekly parties. The Bajas
never paid Baoanan for her services, fed her only leftovers, verbally
abused and denigrated her, made her sleep in the basement with only
one sheet, restricted her use of the telephone, and refused to let her
leave the house unaccompanied.153
When Baoanan brought suit against Baja, the parties first focused
on whether Baja‘s conduct fell within the commercial-activities
exception of the VCDR.154 Under this theory, it is highly likely that
the court would have dismissed Baoanan‘s suit because of the
expansive reach of diplomatic immunity. However, in its Statement of
Interest, the government argued that the court should instead focus on
whether to apply residual immunity because Baoanan filed the
complaint on June 24, 2008, and Baja‘s term ended on February 21,
2007.155 The government explained that it has ―consistently
149 Id.

at 15.

150 Id.
151 Id.
152 627

F. Supp. 2d 155, 158–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
at 158–59.
154 Id. at 159–60.
155 Statement of Interest of the United States, at 2, Baonan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter Gov‘t Statement, Baoanan].
153 Id.
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interpreted Article 39 of the VCDR to permit the exercise of U.S.
jurisdiction over persons whose status as members of the diplomatic
mission has been terminated for acts they committed during the
period in which they enjoyed privileges and immunities,‖ but not ―for
acts performed in the exercise of the functions as a member of the
mission.‖156 The government supported its position by stating that its
interpretation is ―consistent with the practice of other sovereign
states, including [those] which are parties to the Vienna
Convention.‖157
In its Statement of Interest, the government discussed the district
court‘s analysis of residual immunity in Sabbithi v. Al Saleh.158 Since
Sabbithi filed her complaint and served Baja with process while he
was still an accredited diplomat, the government recommended—and
the court granted—the diplomat‘s motion to dismiss based on
diplomatic immunity. At the end of the opinion, the court discussed
the possibility of the residual-immunity claim. The court held that the
―defendant‘s immunity remains intact for acts performed in the
exercise of his duties as a diplomatic officer‖ even after his term had
ended because the employment of the plaintiff ―was not performed
outside the exercise of defendants‘ diplomatic functions.‖159 The
government did not comment on residual immunity in its Statement
of Interest in the Sabbithi case because it was not applicable, but the
government ―respectfully disagree[d]‖ with the Sabbithi court‘s
residual-immunity analysis in its Statement of Interest for Baoanan.160
Specifically, it disagreed with the ―belief that if the hiring of domestic
employees is not a commercial activity under Article 31(1)(c), it
follows that it must be an official act and therefore merits residual
immunity provided under Article 39(2).‖161 Rather, the government
recommended that even if a former diplomat‘s conduct was not a
commercial activity, the court should conduct a separate analysis to
determine whether the former diplomat‘s conduct was an official act,
therefore falling within the grant of residual immunity.162
The court in Baoanan adopted the government‘s recommended
approach and concurred with the Swarna court‘s analysis in
determining whether the conduct constituted an ―official act.‖163 The
156 Id.

at 6 (internal citation omitted).
at 7 (internal citation omitted).
158 Id. at 11. For the facts of Sabbithi, see supra text accompanying notes 85–87.
159 Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130 (D.D.C. 2009).
160 Gov‘t Statement, Baoanan, supra note 155, at 12.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 14.
163 Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (―[A]cts allegedly
committed by Baja that were performed in the furtherance of his diplomatic functions such that
157 Id.
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court first rejected Baja‘s argument that the mere act of hiring a
domestic worker was an official act and then examined the specific
circumstances of the employment to ascertain whether the act was
private or official.164 The court also rejected Baja‘s argument that the
Philippine government‘s issuance of a red passport (i.e. a government
passport) and the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines granting of a G-5
visa (which is granted to employees of officials for international
organizations) made it an official act.165 The court noted that the
documents themselves describe the employment of domestic workers
as a private act.166
The court also analyzed Baoanan‘s duties of cooking, cleaning,
doing laundry, monitoring Mrs. Baja‘s blood pressure, and providing
child care, and determined that these services were performed only to
benefit the Baja family‘s personal needs and ―are unrelated to Baja‘s
diplomatic functions as a member of the mission.‖ 167 Following the
Swarna analysis, the court concluded that the ―tangential benefit‖ to
the Philippine Mission gained from Baoanan‘s preparing for and
cleaning up after the Bajas‘ parties was not enough.168
Lastly, the court analyzed Baja‘s argument that this case should
come out differently because the family resided at the Philippine
Mission itself, whereas the diplomat in Swarna had a separate private
residence.169 The court held that while it should consider the physical
location of the employment, that location was not dispositive.170
Based on this analysis, the court held that Baoanan‘s employment as a
domestic worker at the Philippine Mission was a private act and
therefore Baja was not immune from civil jurisdiction.171
Baoanan also brought claims of human trafficking, involuntary
servitude, and forced labor. The court held that these actions, if true,
were not performed as a function of the mission nor on behalf of the

they are ‗in law the acts of the sending state‘ are official acts; all other acts are private acts for
which residual immunity is not available.‖ (quoting DENZA, supra note 21, at 439)).
164 Id. at 165–70.
165 Id. at 167.
166 Id. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs‘ guidelines for issuing a red passport
provide ―information and guidance [to] Foreign Service personnel who wish to bring private
staff to their posts of assignment.‖ Id. (internal quotations omitted). Similarly, the G-5 passport
is granted to ―an attendant or personal employee of an official or other employee of a diplomatic
or consular mission or international organization.‖ Id. at 168 (internal quotations omitted).
167 Id. at 168.
168 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
169 Id. at 168–69.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 170.
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sending State but rather were also private acts not covered by residual
immunity.172
With the Swarna and Baoanan decisions, along with the
government‘s support of the courts‘ analysis and holdings, domestic
workers have a good chance of surviving the motion to dismiss if they
file their complaint after their diplomat-employer is no longer an
accredited diplomat in the United States. If the diplomat is still
serving as a diplomat in another country, the domestic worker who
experienced the harm in the U.S. can still seek justice in U.S. federal
court because the diplomat‘s term in the U.S. is over, and therefore he
enjoys only residual immunity. If victims can escape and wait until
the diplomat is no longer acting in his capacity as a diplomat in the
U.S., those who can show that their employers abused, exploited, or
trafficked them can legally stay in the U.S. under certain
accommodations and visas.173 These procedures allow the victims to
remain in the U.S. and file suit under the residual-immunity theory,
even years after they stop working for the diplomat. However, the
waiting period that results from bringing the claims under residual
immunity imposes incredible burdens on the victims who likely do
not have family or friends in the U.S., a place to live, or money to live
on because they never received wages. The victims may be unable to
remain in the U.S. until they can file suit because of these emotional,
financial, and practical constraints. As a result, victims may never
obtain justice. Therefore, it is necessary to provide other avenues of
relief to these human-trafficking victims within the U.S.
C. Human-Trafficking Exception to Diplomatic Immunity
Because residual immunity applies only after the diplomat ceases
to serve as a diplomat in the U.S., a stronger and more comprehensive
172 Id.
173 There are three main immigration accommodations available to victims. Under the
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
(WWTVPRA), once an A-3 or G-5 visa holder files a complaint, the Department of Homeland
Security may grant the alleged victim continued presence so that the victims can legally stay in
the U.S. and work ―for time sufficient to fully and effectively participate in all legal proceedings
related to such action.‖ Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 203(c)(1)(a), 122 Stat. 5044, 5058 (2008). The
victim can also apply for either the T-visa or the U-visa. The T-visa is granted to victims of ―a
severe form of trafficking in persons‖ who, because of trafficking, are physically present in the
U.S. or at an American port of entry. Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I) (2006). Victims are also able to apply for a U-visa, which is granted to
persons who have ―suffered substantial physical or mental abuse‖ due to specified acts of
violence, including involuntary servitude. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I).With the T-visa or the U-visa,
the victim can work in the U.S., apply for government benefits such as food stamps and medical
care, and after three years can file for adjustment of status to be a lawful permanent resident.
§ 1101(a)(15)(U); GAO Report, supra note 9, at 10.
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policy should be enacted and accepted to solve this problem.
However, due to the international nature of the problem, and
diplomatic immunity‘s status as a basic principle of universally
accepted international law, federal courts or Congress cannot act
unilaterally to create a human-trafficking exception to diplomatic
immunity that would apply in U.S. courts. Nonetheless, the humantrafficking exception to diplomatic immunity would fulfill the goals
of bringing justice to those who have been treated as slaves on U.S.
soil and reducing the likelihood that diplomats would continue
engaging in this practice. The impact on U.S foreign relations of the
United States unilaterally creating a human-trafficking exception,
however, is too devastating to be a realistic option.
One concern is the strain on American relations with other States
because allowing diplomats to be sued in U.S. courts would be a clear
violation of international law under the VCDR. As the government
argued in Sabbithi, the ―privileges and immunities accorded to
diplomats under the Vienna Convention are vital to the conduct of
peaceful international relations and must be respected. If the United
States is prevented from carrying out its international obligation to
protect the immunities of foreign diplomats, adverse consequences
may well obtain.‖174
Another major concern is that a departure from the international
consensus would hurt American diplomats abroad. The courts and the
government explain, ―[r]ecent history is unfortunately replete with
examples demonstrating how fragile is the security for American
diplomats and personnel in foreign countries; their safety is a matter
of real and continuing concern.‖175 The Tabion court elaborated that
―[t]o protect United States diplomats from criminal and civil
prosecution in foreign lands with differing cultural and legal norms as
well as fluctuating political climates, the United States has bargained
to offer that same protection to diplomats visiting this country.‖176
The federal courts have realized that ―by upsetting existing treaty
relationships American diplomats abroad may well be denied lawful
protection of their lives and property to which they would otherwise
be entitled.‖177

174 Gov‘t

Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 24–25.
at 25 (quoting 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Permanent Mission of the Rep. of Zaire to
the United Nations, 988 F.2d 295, 301 (2d Cir. 1993)).
176 Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285, 293 (E.D.Va. 1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir.
1996).
177 Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
23, 2002) (quoting 757 Third Ave. Assocs., 988 F.2d at 296).
175 Id.
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Finally, the government is also concerned that other states would
respond by subjecting American diplomats to controversial and
possibly unwarranted litigation in foreign jurisdictions.178 Many
courts have agreed and stated that ―[b]ecause not all countries provide
the level of due process to which United States citizens have become
accustomed, and because diplomats are particularly vulnerable to
exploitation for political purposes, immunity for American diplomats
abroad is essential.‖179
The international community as a whole must take action to solve
this problem and avoid the consequences of deviating from the global
consensus for multiple reasons. First, domestic-worker trafficking by
diplomats occurs around the world.180 Secondly, countries in addition
to the U.S. likely have similar concerns about repercussions for their
diplomats if they unilaterally take a harder stance against diplomats
engaged in human trafficking inside their own residences. Thirdly, the
international community broadly supports the eradication of human
trafficking worldwide. For example, the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (TVPA)181 specifically provides that the ―United States
and the international community agree that trafficking in persons
involves grave violations of human rights and is a matter of pressing
international concern‖ and cites twelve declarations, treaties, U.N.
resolutions, and reports that condemn involuntary servitude, violence
against women, and other components of trafficking in persons.182
Additionally, Article 6(2) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
178 Gov‘t

Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 21.
877 F. Supp. at 293.
180 For example, the 2009 Trafficking in Persons Report noted that the ―trafficking of
workers for domestic servitude and trafficking for sexual exploitation continued to be
committed by some members of the international community posted in Belgium. The Belgian
government has conducted campaigns to reduce this problem and investigate such cases.‖ U.S.
DEP‘T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 78 (2009), available at http://www.state.
gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/123135.htm. Similar problems were reported in France. Id. at 135.
181 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2006).
182 Id. § 7101(b)(23) (explaining ―[t]he international community has repeatedly condemned
slavery and involuntary servitude, violence against women, and other elements of trafficking,
through declarations, treaties, and United Nations resolutions and reports, including the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition
of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; the 1948
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man; the 1957 Abolition of Forced Labor
Convention; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; United Nations
General Assembly Resolutions 50/167, 51/66, and 52/98; the Final Report of the World
Congress against Sexual Exploitation of Children (Stockholm, 1996); the Fourth World
Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995); and the 1991 Moscow Document of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe‖).
179 Tabion,
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Organized Crime obligates each State Party to ensure that its
domestic legal or administrative system offers ―victims of trafficking
in persons . . . (a) [i]nformation on relevant court and administrative
proceedings; (b) [a]ssistance to enable their views and concerns to be
presented and considered at appropriate stages of criminal
proceedings against offenders, in a manner not prejudicial to the
rights of the defence.‖183 Each State Party must also ―ensure that its
domestic legal system contains measures that offer victims of
trafficking in persons the possibility of obtaining compensation for
damage suffered.‖184 However, because of diplomatic immunity, State
Parties cannot carry out these obligations with respect to trafficking
victims who are domestic workers of diplomats.
An ideal option would be for the U.N. to adopt a humantrafficking exception to the VCDR modeled after the commercialactivities exception. Even though the VCDR does not provide for a
method of amendment, State Parties do have the power to create a
human-trafficking exception.185 The proposing party state could argue
that human trafficking is similarly, or even more ―wholly inconsistent
with the position of the diplomatic agent, and that one possible
consequence of his engaging in them might be that he would be
declared persona non grata.‖186 State Parties may also recognize the
injustice of ―a diplomatic agent, ignoring the restraints which his
status ought to have imposed upon him‖ forcing a human trafficking
victim who worked for the diplomatic agent ―to go abroad in order to
have the case settled by a foreign court.‖187 In addition, State Parties
might be inclined to accept this exception if their own ―diplomatic
officers are forbidden to engage in such activities in the country of
their assignment, [and] other states have not all been so inclined to
restrict the activities of their diplomatic agents.‖188 The wording
would have to be very limited in scope for the amendment to even be
considered, but a State Party could propose language reflective of the
phrasing of the commercial-activities exception. One possible
183 G.A.

Res. 55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 at Annex II, Art. 6(2) (Jan. 8,

2001).
184 Id.

at Annex II, art. 6(6).
supra note 21, at 7.
186 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48 at 11 (quoting Report of the Commission to
the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/3859, reprinted in [1958] 2 Y.B. Int‘l L. Comm‘n 98, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.1);Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285, 290 (E.D.Va. 1995),
aff’d, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting same).
187 Gov't Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 10 (quoting Special Rapporteur on
Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities: Summary of
Observations Received from Governments and Conclusions of the Special Rapporteur, Int‘l Law
Comm‘n, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/116 (May 2, 1958) (by A. Emil F. Sandström)).
188 Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted) (quoting WHITEMAN, supra note 56, at 406).
185 DENZA,
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wording for the human-trafficking could be: ―a diplomatic agent is
not immune from suit arising from actions relating to human
trafficking inside the sending State‘s mission or inside the diplomat‘s
residence.‖
The key question, of course, is whether there will be the requisite
political will to take such a bold move. As noted above, there is
strong international and national support for combating human
trafficking,189 but the difficulty of passing any amendment to the
VCDR remains a major issue. The VCDR has remained unamended
because governments continue to favor protecting their diplomats and
missions from ―terrorism, mob violence, and intrusive harassment
from unfriendly States‖ over combating abuse via an amendment.190
Instead, governments have decided to ―use the remedies already
provided in the Convention more vigorously even where this carried
short-term political disadvantages, to invoke countermeasures on a
basis of reciprocity, and to build up coalitions to apply pressure on
States flouting normal rules of international conduct.‖191 Therefore, it
is more likely that governments will choose to use existing tools in
the VCDR, such as declaring an abusive diplomat persona non grata,
than to agree upon a human trafficking exception to the VCDR.
However, given the gravity of the problem and the international push
towards the fight against human trafficking, it is possible that State
Parties may now consider a limited human-trafficking exception to
diplomatic immunity.
Even if the international community would craft a humantrafficking exception in the Vienna Convention or if a domestic
worker prevails against her diplomat employer in court under residual
immunity, the problem still remains that litigants themselves are
unable to obtain meaningful relief because diplomats are typically
judgment-proof. First, the domestic worker will likely be unable to
find any property or bank accounts of the former diplomat within the
court‘s jurisdiction for her to attach because the diplomat most likely
closed any U.S. bank accounts and took all his property out of the
U.S. upon leaving the country. Secondly, the domestic worker will
189 See

supra notes 181–84.
supra note 21, at 7.
191 Id. at 7–8. After the 1984 shooting at the Libyan People‘ Bureau in London, the House
of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) drafted a report on the abuse of diplomatic
immunities. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE: THE ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES AND
PRIVILEGES, 1984–85, H.C. 127 (U.K.) [hereinafter FAC REPORT]. The FAC addressed the
possibility of amending the VCDR to include limitations on ―immunity from criminal
jurisdiction of accredited diplomats‖ and ―personal immunity after participation in acts of
terrorism,‖ but decided against recommending an amendment because the practical difficulties
of getting it passed and fear of reciprocity. Id. ¶¶ 53–57.
190 DENZA,
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not be able to place a levy on the mission or embassy because the
judgment indicates that the diplomat was acting outside of his official
functions in the misconduct, and therefore was no longer acting on
behalf of the State.
One possible solution to this problem is to require diplomats to
post a bond before the household worker‘s visa is approved.
Therefore, if the household worker sues the diplomat, she will be able
to attach the bond and, if she wins, she will at least be able to recover
the value of the bond. However, it is unlikely that the U.S. would, in
practice, require diplomats, especially those with a clean record, to
post a bond because of the fear of reciprocity and tarnishing relations
with the diplomat and her sending State. Therefore, a domestic
worker most likely will never be compensated for the money she
earned during her employment.
However, the fact that a domestic worker is unable to collect her
judgment does not detract from the deterrent value of winning a
favorable judgment. Even if the plaintiff cannot be made whole,
another goal of a judgment against the diplomat is to prevent these
atrocities from happening in the future. Once the government or the
international organization is aware of diplomats who have been
reported or convicted of abusing household workers, they can prevent
those diplomats from being granted future A-3 and G-5 visas. Part III
will also propose other available deterrent measures that the
government and international organizations can and should adopt.
The following solutions are forward-looking and aimed towards the
goals of deterring diplomats from abusing their domestic workers in
the future.
III. IMMIGRATION AND INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES
A. Improve Visa Issuance and Implementation Procedures at
Embassies and Consulates
The United States, as a partial solution to the problem, could
reduce the likelihood that domestic workers even begin working for
an abusive diplomat by improving visa issuance procedures and
implementing these procedures at U.S. embassies and consulates
overseas. Domestic-worker employees of officials who work for
foreign embassies, consulates, and governments are eligible for an A3 visa, and domestic workers of staff members of international
organizations, such as the U.N. or the World Bank, are eligible for a
G-5 visa. Between 2000 and 2007, American embassies and
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consulates overseas granted 7,522 G-5 visas and 10,386 A-3 visas.192
The State Department‘s Foreign Affairs Manual requires that Foreign
Service officers follow a certain process and ensure that certain
criteria are met before approving A-3 and G-5 employment
contracts.193 Most of the measures are designed to prevent domestic
workers from obtaining visas to come to the U.S. under circumstances
that a consular officer finds suspicious. To obtain an A-3 or G-5 visa,
the applicant must submit: an employment contract signed by both the
employer and the employee containing an agreement that the
employer will abide by all federal, state, and local laws; a guarantee
that the employer will pay the greater of either the minimum wage or
the prevailing wage; details on the frequency and form of payment,
work duties, weekly work hours, holidays, sick days, and vacation
days; an employee statement that she will not work elsewhere; an
employer statement that he will not withhold the passport;
employment contract, or other personal property of the employee; and
a statement that both the employer and employee understand that the
employee can remain on the premises after hours only if
compensated.194 In addition, the applicant must submit the contract in
English and in a language that the applicant comprehends to help
ensure that the applicant understands his or her rights and duties.195
Even though these policies are in place, they are not always
executed effectively. Based on visits to four consular posts, the July
2008 GAO Report found that some consular officers were unfamiliar
with or uncertain about certain aspects of guidance on the issuance of
A-3 and G-5 visas.196 For example, the GAO found that many officers
did not realize that a diplomatic note from the diplomat‘s embassy or
mission confirming the employer‘s diplomatic status was required to
process the application,197 or that they were supposed to electronically
scan the employment contracts into the Consular Affairs Consolidated
Database.198 Additionally, the GAO discovered that many of the
contracts did not contain all of the necessary criteria. For instance,
71% of the contracts at one post, 35% at the second, 23% at the third,
and 6% at the fourth did not contain at least one of the necessary
criteria.199 Some contracts had multiple deficiencies. One contract, for
example, paid the employee below the minimum wage and omitted
192 GAO

Report, supra note 9, at 7.
U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, Foreign Affairs Manual 41.21 N6.2 (2009) [hereinafter FAM].
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 22.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 23.
199 Id. at 21.
193 9
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the section providing that the employer could not require the
employee to stay on the premises after working hours without pay.200
Additionally, at a post in a country where residents rarely spoke or
read English, the GAO found that all of the contracts were written
only in English, though it is required that the contract be translated
into the language familiar to the applicant as well.201
There were also deficiencies in the information that many officers
gave applicants. The officers were unaware, and therefore did not
inform applicants, of the telephone hotline for reporting abuse and of
the State Department‘s advice to call 911 in case of an emergency or
for help. Nor did they give applicants the anti-trafficking brochere
recommended by the State Department.202 The GAO explained the
importance of these educational measures by sharing the words of
workers who reported abuse. One worker recommended that
American embassies should inform A-3 and G-5 visa applicants of
their rights and provide contact information for resources that to
which victims can turn. She explained that the employers often
continue the abuse by telling the workers that they are not protected
by U.S. law, but rather are subject to the laws of the diplomat‘s
state.203 Another abuse victim stated that she knew to seek help
because the consular officer explained her rights to her at the visa
interview.204
The government responded to this inconsistency in information
dissemination by requiring, under the William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
(WWTVPRA),205 that the consular officer inform the applicant of his
or her legal rights under federal immigration, labor, and employment
laws, including explaining the ―illegality of slavery, peonage,
trafficking in persons, sexual assault, extortion, blackmail, and
worker exploitation‖206 during the visa interview. WWTVPRA also
requires that consular officers give applicants a pamphlet207 that
explains the workers‘ legal rights and answers important questions
such as ―what should I do if my rights are violated?‖ and ―will I be
200 Id.
201 Id.

at 21–22.
at 22–23. Under the WWTVPRA, it is now required that consular officers give a
pamphlet similar to the pamphlet that the GAO recommended. See supra note 173.
203 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 23.
204 Id.
205 Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008).
206 Id. § 202(b)(3); FAM, supra note 193, at 41.21 N6.5-1.
207 Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 202, 122 Stat. 5055; U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, WWTVPRA
PAMPHLET (2009), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/Pamphlet-Order.pdf [hereinafter
WVTVPRA PAMPHLET]; FAM, supra note 193, at N6.5-2 (Consular Officer Responsibilities).
202 Id.
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deported if I report the abuse?‖ The pamphlet encourages workers to
get help if their rights are violated and provides the telephone
numbers for the National Human Trafficking Resource Center‘s 24hour hotline (a non-governmental organization), the Trafficking in
Persons and Worker Exploitation Task Force Complaint Line (run by
the Department of Justice), and 911.208
Since consulate officers are unaware or uncertain of many policies
essential to combating the domestic-worker trafficking, the
WWTVPRA now requires the State Department to provide training to
consular officers on fair labor standards, human trafficking, changes
resulting from the WWTVPRA, and information in the pamphlet that
consular officers are required to give and review with the applicant.209
In addition, the State Department can require a consular officer to fill
out and attach a checklist of all the requirements to the applicant‘s
file. The checklist is a quick and easy way to ensure that all the
requirements are known and met, thereby reducing the number of
dodgy A-3 and G-5 visas granted.
The State Department has taken some action to address the
confusion over when consular officers may and must deny A-3 and
G-5 visas, but more needs to be done. The GAO found that many
consular officers were unsure of the circumstances under which they
could refuse to grant the visas because the Foreign Affairs Manual
did not explicitly provide that officers may deny applications if they
were concerned about abuse or mistreatment.210 Therefore, many
officers reported that they often felt compelled to approve a visa
application, even if it was suspicious, so long as there was a valid
employment contract.211 Congress solved part of the problem by
requiring the Secretary of State to suspend the issuance of A-3 or G-5
visas if ―the Secretary determines that there is credible evidence that 1
or more employees of such mission or international organization have
abused or exploited 1 or more nonimmigrants holding an A-3 visa or
a G-5 visa, and that the diplomatic mission or international
organization tolerated such actions.‖212 The State Department will
208 WWTVPRA PAMPHLET, supra note 207; FAM, supra note 193, at N6.5-1 (Contents of
Information Packet).
209 Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 203(b)(3), 122 Stat. 5055 The State Department issued a
telegram to all diplomatic and consular posts explaining the changes of the WWTVPRA.
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, U.S. DEP‘T OF
STATE (June, 2009), http://travel.state.gov/visa/laws/telegrams/telegrams_4542.html.
210 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 24.
211 Id. at 25.
212 Pub. L. No. 110-457, §203(a)(3), 122 Stat. 5055, reflected in FAM, supra note 193, at
N6.6, (―Suspension of Processing of A-3 and G-5 Applications from Certain Foreign Missions
and International Organizations‖).

12/30/2010 9:04:35 PM

300

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1

then notify all visa processing posts of the suspension so that no A-3
or G-5 visas are issued.213
The State Department can base its decision to suspend the issuance
of the visas from two major sources of information that Congress
requires the executive branch to maintain. First, Congress requires the
Secretary of State to maintain records of each A-3 and G-5 visaholder‘s date of entrance and permanent exit; the official title, contact
information, and immunity of the employer; and any information
about any allegations of employer abuse received by the State
Department.214 Secondly, by December 2010, the federal departments
must combine all relevant information collected by each department
or agency in the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking into an ―integrated database‖ within the Human
Smuggling and Trafficking Center.215
Though these provisions are important additions and will be useful
in stopping the recurrence of the problem by repeat offenders, the
Foreign Affairs Manual still fails to provide concrete circumstances
in which a consular officer may or must refuse to grant the visa. The
State Department explained that ―officers have little to go on beyond
the contract and [that] it is impossible to refuse a visa based on
something that has not happened or will not happen for another 6
months.‖216 However, there still may be signs that mistreatment is
likely, and the State Department should clarify that consular officers
have the discretion to deny visas in suspicious circumstances.
Consular officials at State Department headquarters told the GAO that
―it is appropriate and even expected for consular officers to refuse A3 and G-5 visas if they believe that visa applicants may be abused by
their prospective employers.‖217 But since that expectation is not
expressed in the Foreign Affairs Manual, and no examples are
provided, consular officers may still feel compelled to grant the visa
if all of the technical requirements are met. The State Department
may consider adding that consular officers may deny a visa if the
applicant is under eighteen, if the employer resisted the private
interview between the applicant and the consular officer, or if the
applicant had not yet met the employer.218

213 FAM,

supra note 193, at N6.6.
L. No. 110-457, § 203(b)(4), 122 Stat. 5055.
215 Id. § 108(a), 122 Stat. 5021.
216 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
217 Id.
218 These are circumstances under which consular officers have denied, or wanted to deny,
A-3 and G-5 visas in the past. GAO Report, supra note 9, at 24–25.
214 Pub.
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B. Continuing Oversight of A-3 and G-5 Visa-holders
Even if consular officers follow all the procedures perfectly,
diplomats may still decide to ignore the employment contracts and
abuse the domestic workers. To combat diplomats disregarding the
terms of the contract, Congress should consider requiring A-3 and G5 visa-holders to meet with a United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) officer three months after their arrival
in the U.S. The purpose of the meeting would be to give the visaholder a guaranteed opportunity to reveal any problems or abuse to
the USCIS officer and allow the USCIS officer to remind the
domestic worker of the resources available to them if they are later
abused. If the visa-holder does not show up or reports abuse, USCIS
should have the authority to investigate the situation. If the diplomat
resists the investigation or the investigation supports the abuse
allegations, USCIS should be able revoke the A-3 or G-5 visa and
change the domestic worker‘s visa classification to a T-visa or a Uvisa, which would allow the victim to remain in the U.S., find work,
apply for food stamps and medical care, and after three years file for
adjustment of status to be a lawful permanent resident.219 This policy
would help victims get out of the abusive environment, identify
abusive diplomats, and prevent abusive diplomats from obtaining A-3
and G-5 visas in the future.
Additionally, international organizations can take control of the
problem by establishing effective procedures for conducting internal
review and providing institutional methods of relief. The IMF and
World Bank provide a good example of this. In 1999, a Washington
Post article220 and editorial221 revealed that the IMF and World Bank
officials were ―some of the worst offenders‖ of household worker
abuse and that both ―take a hands-off approach once the workers are
here.‖222 Subsequently, the IMF and World Bank have sought to
improve their efforts to prevent, investigate, and stop abuse of
household workers.223 The World Bank created a model internal
review system that establishes appropriate oversight for the
employment of G-5 household workers. It also created a Code of
Conduct Regarding Employment of G-5 Domestic Employees,224
219 Id.

at 10, 24–25.
Branigin, A Life of Exhaustion, Beatings, and Isolation, WASH. POST, Jan. 5,
1999, at A6.
221 Editorial, Not in This Country, They Can’t, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1999, at A24.
222 Id.
223 Michel Camdessus & James D. Wolfensohn, Letter to the Editor, WASH. POST, Jan. 16,
1999, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/1999/011699.htm.
224 F00042 World Bank Group Code of Conduct Regarding Employment of G5 Domestic
220 William
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which obligates each staff member to comply with the provisions of
federal, state, and local law related to the employment of G-5
domestic employees and provides that violations may result in
disciplinary action, such as loss in the privilege of employing a G-5
employee and dismissal.225 The Code offers specific examples
regarding what is to be included in the employment contract, such as
the requirement that the contract must contain a complaint procedure
that enables the G-5 employee to make a complaint regarding his or
her fair treatment to the World Bank‘s Office of Professional Ethics
or with the Human Resources Department.226 The World Bank also
requires that the staff member and the G-5 employee attend an
orientation program together explaining their mutual rights and
responsibilities soon after their arrival in the U.S.; if they both do not
attend the orientation, the World Bank may withhold any visa
services for the staff member.227 Additionally, the World Bank
requires the staff member to maintain specific records of the G-5
employee‘s position for the entire period of employment and for a
minimum of three calendar years after the G-5 employee‘s
termination.228 These records are subject to periodic audit or audit in
response to a complaint.229
Although these procedures are in place, the practical effects of the
measures vary. Some workers have complained that they experienced
―months-long delays [after filing a complaint] and hostility when they
finally meet with World Bank officials.‖230 Moreover, these
procedures may be helpful for those household workers who wish to
remain employed by the World Bank staff member, but those who
wish to be made whole through damages have no relief under the
process.

Employees, THE WORLD BANK (2009), http://go.worldbank.org/5T74JMNEB0 [hereinafter
World Bank Code of Conduct].
225 Id. at 1.
226 Id. at 3.
227 Id.
228 Id. For example, the staff member must keep a copy of the employment contract and
any amendments, proof of wage payments, derivation of deductions taken from gross wages
each pay period, a dated contemporaneous timesheet signed and dated by both the staff member
and the G-5 employee at least on a weekly basis, copies of any health insurance policy and
proof of payment by the staff member for insurance premiums, and various other documents. Id.
at 3–4.
229 Id. at 4.
230 Krista Friedrich, Note, Statutes of Liberty? Seeking Justice Under United States Law
When Diplomats Traffic in Persons, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1139, 1164, (2007) (quoting Lora Jo
Foo, The Trafficking of Asian Women, in ASIAN AMERICAN WOMEN: ISSUES, CONCERNS, AND
RESPONSIVE HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCACY 47, 51 (2002)).

12/30/2010 9:04:35 PM

2010]

DOES IMMUNITY MEAN IMPUNITY?

303

A household worker could theoretically file a complaint with the
World Bank and the World Bank could threaten or use disciplinary
action to resolve the problem. The World Bank stipulates, ―the staff
member may not interfere with such complaints or retaliate against
the G5 domestic employee for any good faith statement or action by
or on behalf of the employee in connection with a complaint.‖231
However, there remains no relief for domestic workers who want to
stop working for the diplomat and obtain their unpaid salaries. The
harshest punishment that the World Bank can give is dismissal, but
the staff member‘s dismissal will not lead to the domestic worker
regaining lost wages.
IV. DIPLOMATIC PROCESS
The government can also work through the diplomatic process to
pursue allegations of abuse and ensure compliance with U.S. law.
Informally, the State Department can try to intercede and help the
parties resolve the problem outside of court. The government asserts
that simply calling attention to the diplomat‘s misdeeds sometimes
results in adequately embarrassing the diplomat, thereby inducing him
to voluntarily comply with the law.232 The State Department can also
request that the sending State waive the diplomat‘s immunity,233 but it
is unlikely that the sending State would abandon its representative
and risk the embarrassment of a trial exposing the wrongdoings of the
diplomat, which would reflect badly on the sending State. For
example, in Sabbithi, Kuwait refused the State Department‘s request
to waive the diplomat‘s immunity and the Department of Justice
therefore had to end its investigation of the household-worker‘s
allegations.234 The State Department also has the discretion to refuse
to accept future diplomats from a country that it views as assisting or
approving illegal conduct.235 Furthermore, the U.S. can stop or
decrease economic or developmental aid to a country if it allows its
diplomats to continue in a pattern of breaking American laws in hopes
that the sending country takes measures to stop its diplomat‘s
wrongdoing.236
231 World

Bank Code of Conduct, supra note 224, at 3.
Report, supra note 9, at 10.
233 ―The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents . . . may be waived by the
sending State. Waiver must always be express.‖ VCDR, supra note 19, art 32(1)–(2).
234 Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 125 (D.D.C 2009).
235 See, e.g., Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285, 293 (E.D.Va. 1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d 535
(4th Cir. 1996) (citing The Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act: Hearings on H.R. 3036
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 50 (1988)).
236 Id.
232 GAO
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Another formal measure that the State Department can take is to
declare the diplomat persona non grata under Article 9(1) of the
VCDR. If this happens, the sending State must either recall the
diplomat or terminate his functions, or else the U.S. can expel him.237
As diplomatic-law expert Eileen Denza explains, ―Article 9 has
proved in practice to be a key provision which enables the receiving
State to protect itself against numerous forms of unacceptable activity
by members of diplomatic missions and forms an important
counterweight to the immunities conferred elsewhere in the
Convention.‖238 For example, the United Kingdom successfully used
persona non grata to dramatically decrease the number of diplomats
who deliberately and systematically refused to pay their parking
tickets. The diplomatic corps in London ―reluctantly‖ accepted this
action—even though this use of persona non grata was
unprecedented—because it was within the powers of the receiving
State.239 The United Kingdom has also adopted a policy of declaring
diplomats persona non grata when they engage in espionage,
incitement or advocacy of violence, violent crime, drug trafficking,
firearms offenses, rape, fraud, multiple drunk driving offenses, traffic
offenses involving serious death or injury, driving without third-party
insurance, theft (including large-scale shoplifting), and even multiple
lesser-scale shoplifting offenses.240 Additionally, Denmark, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden have declared diplomatic agents persona non
grata for crimes such as drug trafficking and the illegal importation
and sale of drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes.241
While the U.S. has not been as liberal as the United Kingdom in
using Article 9, it will declare a person persona non grata for the
possession or carrying of unauthorized firearms.242 Even though using
Article 9 would be an effective and internationally acceptable solution
to the problem, the U.S. has stated its reluctance in the past for using
persona non grata because it is concerned about unjustified
reciprocity of its use and tarnishing the ―United States‘ reputation for
being a society governed by the rule of law.‖243
Though the fear of reciprocity should be considered, the
government should not be ―excessively reluctant‖ to declare a
237 VCDR,

supra note 19, art. 9(1); Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 293.
supra note 21, at 76–77.
239 Id. at 86.
240 Id. at 83.
241 Id. at 84.
242 Id. at 85–86.
243 Id. at 85 (quoting Department of State Guidance for Law Enforcement Officers with
regard to Personal Rights and Immunities of Foreign Diplomatic and Consular Personnel,
printed in Feb. 1988, 27 I.L.M. 1617, 1633).
238 DENZA,
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diplomat persona non grata because ―[o]therwise, [the government]
will effectively have conceded the real powers that are available
under the convention to control abuses. The protection against abuse
of diplomatic immunity requires not only well-drawn clauses in a
treaty: it also requires political will.‖ 244 Many leaders in Washington
recently pledged to fight human-trafficking crimes committed by
diplomats.245 This, coupled with the unanimous passage of the
WWTVPRA in 2008, signals that the U.S. may be more willing to
take bolder legislative or diplomatic action.
Just as the U.S. holds the rule of law as a bedrock of American
society, the right to be free from slavery and involuntary servitude is
also fundamental.246 Therefore, the U.S. should not allow the
enslavement and abuse of domestic workers by foreign diplomats in
the U.S. to taint America‘s image as a society dedicated to the
unalienable right of freedom for all. The U.S. can promote both the
image of a society governed by the rule of law and the unalienable
right of freedom for all by adopting a policy of declaring a diplomat
persona non grata for human-trafficking offenses, similar to its
policy regarding firearms offenses. International precedent for taking
bolder action in declaring a diplomat persona non grata for drug
trafficking offenses is already established by the actions by the United
Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway, so it is not a far
stretch to adopt a similar policy for human trafficking. Though this is
only a partial solution (because the victim is not able to recover any
damages for the abuse), at least the abusive diplomat is expelled from
the country and hopefully prevented from obtaining an A-3 or G-5
visa in the future.

244 FAC

REPORT, supra note 191, ¶ 66.
CdeBaca, the Ambassador At-large for Human Trafficking, stated, ―immunity
does not mean impunity to enslave domestic servants on U.S. soil, and we will continue to work
to ensure that these domestic workers are accorded full rights and human dignity in our
country.‖ Fitzpatrick, supra note 14. See also supra text accompanying note 1. Senator Richard
Durbin of Illinois, Chairman of a Senate Subcommittee on Human Rights, has been quoted as
saying: ―It‘s unthinkable that we would let this continue.‖ Kirk Semple, Government Report
Points to Diplomats’ Abuse of Workers They Bring With Them, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at
B3.
246 See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(22)
(2006) (―One of the founding documents of the United States, the Declaration of Independence,
recognizes an inherent dignity and worth of all people. It states that all men are created equal
and that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights. The right to be free
from slavery and involuntary servitude is among those unalienable rights. Acknowledging this
fact, the United States outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude in 1865, recognizing them as
evil institutions that must be abolished. Current practices of sexual slavery and trafficking of
women and children are similarly abhorrent to the principles upon which the United States was
founded.‖).
245 Luis
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CONCLUSION
The stories of courageous women escaping their captivity and
seeking help have opened the public and the government‘s eyes to the
reality of trafficking and exploitation by foreign-diplomat employers.
The legal and political battle of bringing these abusive diplomats to
justice has begun, but there is still much to be accomplished.
Although litigants have recently experienced more success in
obtaining judgments against their diplomat employers under a theory
of residual immunity, judicial avenues of relief are far from adequate.
Not only do the household workers have to wait until the diplomat‘s
term is over before they can bring suit, even if the litigation is
successful, they will likely never be able to collect on the judgment.
However, litigation and formal complaints to international
organizations are extremely important in raising awareness of specific
offenders. Once the government and organizational authorities are
aware of who is involved in the violations, they can prohibit the
perpetrators from bringing over household workers in the future.
Since the most impact will come from forward-looking solutions,
it is necessary to be aware of tools within the government‘s reach.
Legislation is a key tool in combating the abuse. The passage of the
William Wilburforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act was a big step forward. Through this law, Congress tightened the
visa interview process and forced consular officers to explain and
give applicants a copy of a pamphlet outlining their legal rights and
ways to get help. However, Congress needs to pass more legislation
requiring the government to routinely check-up on domestic workers
to make sure that they are not stuck in abusive situations. With
increased public awareness and the pledges of Senator Richard
Durbin, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, and Ambassador
Luis CdeBaca to combat trafficking,247 it is possible that more
legislation on this topic will be passed.
Nonetheless, because of the fear of reciprocity, it is unlikely that
the U.S. government or the international community will pass any
legislation or make any amendments to the VCDR that would make
even a small dent in the absolute nature of diplomatic immunity.
However, the U.S. can and should use the diplomatic process and the
formal measures embodied in the VCDR, such as declaring a
diplomat persona non grata, to combat this problem. The U.S. should
follow the lead of the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden in expanding the use of persona non grata to include
247 See

supra note 245.
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more crimes and be the first country to declare a diplomat persona
non grata for trafficking domestic workers. Therefore, even though
under the current legal framework it is unlikely that the courts or the
government can remedy the abuse that has happened in the past,
authorities may be able to diminish, if not eliminate, similar abuse
from occurring in the future. Action needs to be taken, for indeed,
―[i]t is unthinkable that we would let this continue.‖248
JENNIFER HOOVER KAPPUS†

248 Semple, supra note 245 (quoting Senator Richard Durbin) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
† J.D. Candidate, 2011, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The author
would like to thank specially her husband, Brendan, her parents, and her brother, David, for
their never-ending love and support, and Professor Jonathan Entin, Professor Richard Gordon,
and Sarah Greenlee for their guidance and advice throughout the note-writing process.

